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CIVIL LIBERTIES, FEAR, AND TERRORISM 
 
 
John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 No defense of civil liberties is likely to be terribly effective as long as 
people believe there is a threat out there that is dire, even existential. 
 The risk from terrorism has been massively exaggerated, but that fact 
has only very rarely been explained or even examined by those who are 
appalled at the system those exaggerations have spawned.  Concerns are raised 
about prosecutorial misconduct, about the potential entrapment or 
misidentification of suspects, and about the legality of Guantánamo.  Entirely 
legitimate concerns of course, but ones likely to be ineffective in front of 
judges anxious to set deterring examples and of juries composed of frightened 
citizens. 
 As Figure 1 suggests, there has been little change in the fear factor 
since the trauma of September 11, 2001.  And until the fear of terrorism within 
the United States is undercut, little progress is likely to be made in seeking to 
reduce the cost and civil liberties excesses of the still-burgeoning 
counterterrorism enterprise.  There are a number of notable precedents for this 
condition.  An examination of two of these, which follow, may be instructive.  
I.   WITCHES 
 Between about 1480 and 1680, tens, or perhaps even hundreds, of 
thousands of people, the vast majority of them women, were executed in 
Europe, mostly by being burned at the stake.1  This took place after they had 
confessed, generally (but not always) under torture, to such crimes as, in 
Steven Pinker’s enumeration, “eating babies, wrecking ships, destroying crops, 
flying on broomsticks on the Sabbath, copulating with devils, transforming 
their demon lovers into cats and dogs, and making ordinary men impotent by 
convincing them that they had lost their penises.”2  For example, notes 
historian Hugh Trevor-Roper, one square in a German town “looked like a 
little forest, so crowded were the stakes,” and during an eight year reign one 
prince-bishop “burnt 900 persons, including his own nephew, nineteen 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
* John Mueller is Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International 
Security Studies at Ohio State University and Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute.  Mark 
Stewart is professor of Civil Engineering at the University of Newcastle, Australia.  Their 
book, Terror, Security, and Money: Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of Homeland 
Security, was published in 2011 by Oxford University Press. 
1 See generally H. R. TREVOR-ROPER, The European Witch-Craze of the Sixteenth and 
Seventeenth Centuries, in THE EUROPEAN WITCH-CRAZE OF THE SIXTEENTH AND 
SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES AND OTHER ESSAYS 90-191 (1969). 
2 See Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined 137–
38 (2011). 
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Catholic priests, and children of seven who were said to have had intercourse 
with demons.”3 
 During this long period, a few people tried to debunk the process and 
some were tortured and executed themselves because of such heresy.4  Their 
attacks on it were ineffectual because they went after the consequences of the 
system, not its premise: that witches exist and that they are key elements of an 
on-going battle on earth between God and the Devil.5  As Trevor-Roper puts it, 
“[m]en revolted against the cruelty of torture, against the implausibility of 
confessions, [and] against the identification of witches.  They did not revolt 
against the central doctrine of the kingdom of Satan and its war on humanity 
by means of demons and witches.”6 
 Crucially, Trevor-Roper observes, “[i]f the witch-craze were to be 
attacked at its centre, not merely doubted at its periphery, it was necessary to 
challenge the whole conception of the kingdom of Satan.”7  The witch-craze, 
with its colossal human, societal, and material costs, only died out, says 
Trevor-Roper, when theologians were able to sell a re-evaluation of the 
premise in which the notion of the “duel in Nature between a Hebrew God and 
a medieval Devil was replaced by the benevolent despotism of a modern, 
scientific ‘Deity.’”8 
II.  DOMESTIC COMMUNISTS 
 In a fascinating book, German literary specialist Alexander Stephan 
describes the US government’s surveillance of a group of émigré writers 
during and after World War II.  None was found to pose much of a subversive 
threat, and the surveillance never led to real persecution—indeed, few of the 
writers noticed they were being watched.9  Instead, what impresses Stephan is 
the essential absurdity of the situation: the “high efficiency and grotesque 
overkill” as hundreds of agents were paid to intercept and catalogue 
communications, to endlessly recorded goings and comings, and to sift 
enterprisingly through trash bins seeking scraps of incriminating information 
among the debris.10  For example, as he notes, there is something profoundly 
ludicrous about the fact that dozens of government employees spent their time 
in the middle of a world war monitoring pillow talk between Bertolt Brecht 
and his Danish co-worker, Ruth Berlau, and all, notes Stephan, “at taxpayers’ 
expense.”11 
 To justify and to impel such work, the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) and other agencies for decades clearly exaggerated the degree to which !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 See TREVOR-ROPER, supra note 1, at 156.  
4 Id. at 156. 
5 Id. at 152. 
6 Id.  
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 178. 
9 See ALEXANDER STEPHAN, COMMUNAZIS: FBI SURVEILLANCE OF GERMAN ÉMIGRÉ 
WRITERS xii (Jan van Heurck trans., 2000) (1995). 
10 See id. 
11 See id. 
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domestic Communists presented a threat to the republic.  Then-FBI Director J. 
Edgar Hoover insisted in a 1958 book that the American Communist Party was 
working “day and night to further the communist plot in America” with 
“deadly seriousness,” that a “[B]olshevik transmission” was in progress that 
was “virtually invisible to the non-communist eye, unhampered by time, 
distance, and legality,” that it was “creating communist puppets throughout the 
country,” and that it had for “its objective the ultimate seizure of power in 
America.”12  Thus impelled, Hoover’s agency spent a prodigious amount of 
time and public money pursuing the harmless and the nearly so.  For example, 
in 1972, by which time the public and press were paying almost no attention to 
the issue, the FBI, in full perpetual motion mode, opened 65,000 new files as 
part of its costly quest to ferret out Communists in the United States.13 
 There seem to have been few, if any, instances in which domestic 
Communists engaged in anything that could be considered espionage after the 
Second World War.14  Furthermore, at no time did any domestic Communist 
ever commit anything that could be considered violence in support of the 
cause.15  Nevertheless, critics of this costly and often fundamentally absurd 
anti-Communist process, like those for the witch-craze, focused almost entirely 
on the potential for civil liberties violations.  No one, it seems, attacked the 
premise of the system—that Communists were everywhere and posed a severe 
threat.  That is, at no point during the Cold War did anyone say in public: 
Many domestic Communists adhere to a foreign ideology that 
ultimately has as its goal the destruction of capitalism and 
democracy and by violence if necessary; however, they do not 
present much of a danger, are actually quite a pathetic bunch, 
and couldn't subvert their way out of a wet paper bag.  Why are 
we expending so much time, effort, and treasure over this 
issue?16  
It is astounding that this plausible, if arguable, point of view seems 
never to have been publicly expressed by anyone—politician, pundit, 
professor, editorialist—during the Cold War. 
 Instead, the fear of domestic Communism and the consequent costly 
anti-Communist surveillance system it spawned, persisted for decades.  The 
pursuit died out only when international Communism collapsed at the end of 
the Cold War.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 See J. EDGAR HOOVER, MASTERS OF DECEIT: THE STORY OF COMMUNISM IN AMERICA 
AND HOW TO FIGHT IT 81 (1958); see also Joseph McCarthy, Senator “Enemies from Within,” 
Speech at Wheeling, West Virginia (Feb. 9, 1950).   
13 MIKE O’CONNOR, CRISIS, PURSUED BY DISASTER, FOLLOWED CLOSELY BY 
CATASTROPHE: A MEMOIR OF LIFE ON THE RUN 278–279 (2007); see also JOHN MUELLER AND 
MARK G. STEWART, TERROR, SECURITY, AND MONEY 188 (2011). 
14 See generally JOHN MUELLER AND MARK G. STEWART, TERROR, SECURITY, AND 
MONEY 187-88 (2011) (arguing that the perception of a communist threat faded into a “well 
deserved” oblivion due to a dearth of evidence that communists presented a grave danger). 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
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III. TERRORISTS 
 Something comparable has now happened with the terrorist threat, and 
key to its dynamic is that Americans apparently continue to remain 
unimpressed by several inconvenient facts: 
 1. There have been no true al-Qaeda attacks in the United States since 
2001;17 
 2. No true al-Qaeda cell (nor scarcely anybody who might even be 
deemed to have a “connection” to the diabolical group) has been unearthed in 
the country;18 
 3. The homegrown “plotters” who have been apprehended, while 
perhaps potentially somewhat dangerous at least in a few cases, have mostly 
been flaky or almost absurdly incompetent;19 
 4. Virtually all terrorist violence within the United States has taken 
place on television20 and the number of homicides committed by Muslim 
extremists within the United States represents one fiftieth of one percent of the 
total homicides in the country;21  
 5. The total number of people killed worldwide by al-Qaeda types, 
maybes, and wannabes outside of war zones since 9/11 stands at some 300 or 
so a year (smaller than the yearly number of bathtub drownings in the United 
States alone);22  
 6. Unless the terrorists are able somehow to massively increase their 
capacities (and, if anything, attacks have declined in intensity and 
sophistication), the likelihood a person in the United States will perish at the 
hands of a terrorist is about one in 3.5 million per year.23 
 Unimpressed, the public has chosen, it appears, to wallow in what 
philosopher Leif Wenar has labeled a false sense of insecurity.24  Accordingly, 
the public will presumably continue to demand that its leaders pay due 
deference to its insecurities and will uncritically approve as civil liberties erode 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Id. at 189. 
18 See Brian Ross, Secret FBI Report Questions Al Qaeda Capabilities, ABC NEWS 
ONLINE (Mar. 9, 2005) 
http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/Investigation/story?id=566425&page=1#.TyoD366ryKw (last 
visited Mar. 21, 2012). 
19 See generally JOHN MUELLER (ED.), TERRORISM SINCE 9/11: THE AMERICAN CASES  
(2012), available at http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/faculty/jmueller/SINCE.pdf. 
20 See also HERBERT PHILBRICK, I LED THREE LIVES (1952).  Although FBI informant 
Herbert Philbrick’s confessional book at no point documents a single instance of communist 
violence, planned or otherwise, violence became a central focus when his story was transmuted 
into a popular television series. 
21 See DAVID SCHANZER, CHARLES KURZMAN, EBRAHIM MOOZA, ANTI-TERROR LESSONS 
OF MUSLIM-AMERICANS 16 (2010). 
22 See MUELLER & STEWART, supra note 14, at 189.  
23 See id. 
24 John Mueller, A False Sense of Insecurity?, REGULATION, Aug. 2007, at 43. 
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and huge sums of money are shelled out in a quixotic and often mostly 
symbolic effort to assuage those insecurities.25 
 Accordingly, agencies like the FBI, redirecting much of their effort 
from unglamorous enterprises like dealing with organized crime and white 
collar embezzlement, have kept their primary focus on the terrorist threat.26  
Like their predecessors during the quests to quash witchery and domestic 
Communism, they have dutifully and laboriously assembled masses of 
intelligence data and have pursued an endless array of leads.  Almost all of this 
activity has led nowhere, but it will continue because, of course, no one wants 
to be the one whose neglect somehow leads to “another 9/11”—or, as the 
assistant chief for the FBI's National Threat Center puts it, it’s the lead “you 
don’t take seriously that becomes the 9/11.”27 
 Despite the importance of responsible policies which seek to 
communicate risk, and despite the costs of irresponsible fear-mongering, just 
about the only official who has ever openly put the threat presented by 
terrorism in some sort of context is New York’s Mayor Michael Bloomberg 
who, in 2007, pointed out that people should “get a life” and that they have a 
greater chance of being hit by lightning than of being struck by terrorism28—an 
observation that is a bit off the mark, but roughly sound. 
 Things are not much better in the media.  For example, on the 
December 28, 2009, PBS NewsHour, Gwen Ifill, in introducing a segment on 
the then-recent underwear bomber attempt to down an airliner, happened to 
note that the number of terrorist incidents on American airliners over the 
previous decade was 1 for every 16.5 million flights.29  This interesting bit of 
information, however, was never brought up again either by Ifill or by the three 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 See DANA PRIEST & WILLIAM M. ARKIN, TOP SECRET AMERICA: THE RISE OF THE NEW 
AMERICAN SECURITY STATE 8 (2011) (arguing that American taxpayers “have shelled out 
hundreds billions of dollars to turn the machine of government over to defeating terrorism 
without ever really questioning what they were getting for their money. And even if they did 
want an answer to that question, they would not be given one, both because those same 
officials have decided it would gravely harm national security to share such classified 
information—and because the officials themselves don’t actually know”).  
26 See GARRETT M. GRAFF, THE THREAT MATRIX: THE FBI AT WAR IN THE AGE OF 
TERROR (2011). 
27 See Donna Leinwand, Psst, Information Tips on the Rise from Public to FBI, USA 
TODAY (Aug. 15, 2008), http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2008-08-14-FBI-
tips_N.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2012). For a discussion of New York’s “If You See 
Something, Say Something” campaign that has generated tens of thousands of tips, none of 
which has led to a terrorism arrest, see MUELLER & STEWART, supra note 14, at 162. 
28 See Sewell Chan, Buzz over Mayor’s ‘Get a Life’ Remark, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2007), 
http://empirezone.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/06/06/buzz-over-mayors-get-a-life-remark/ (last 
visited Mar. 21, 2012). 
29 See Gwen Ifill, Christmas Day Bomb Scare Prompts Review of Airport Security, PBS 
NEWSHOUR (Dec. 28, 2009), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/terrorism/july-
dec09/airport1_12-28.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2012).  
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terrorism experts she was interviewing.30  Nor, of course, did anyone think of 
suggesting that, at that rate, maybe the airlines are safe enough. 
 Or put more broadly, the continual question, “are we safer?” is never 
answered with: “at present rates, your chances of being killed by a terrorist are 
about 1 in 3.5 million per year; how much safer do you want to be?”  
 The risk from terrorism, then, like that from witches and from domestic 
Communists, has been massively exaggerated, stoked during the George W. 
Bush administration and still promoted under Barack Obama.  In 2008, then 
Department of Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff uttered the 
bizarre, if exquisitely nuanced, observation to a couple of reporters that the 
threat from terrorism is “a significant existential” one.31  And at a 2011 press 
conference, current Homeland Security Chief Janet Napolitano opaquely, if 
creatively, announced that, though the likelihood of a large-scale organized 
attack is diminished, the continued danger of a small-scale disorganized attack 
means that the terrorist threat is higher than at any time since 9/11.32  Neither 
contention prompted skeptical query from rapt auditors. 
 In result, the costs of homeland security spending, like those entailed in 
the hunts for witches and domestic Communists, have become massive.  
Tallying the expenditures on domestic homeland security and adding in 
opportunity costs—but leaving out related overseas costs such as those entailed 
by the terrorism-induced wars in Iraq and Afghanistan—the increase in 
expenditures on domestic homeland security over the decade exceeds one 
trillion dollars.33 This has not been enough to move the country into 
bankruptcy—Osama bin Laden’s stated goal after 9/11—but it clearly adds up 
to real money, even by Washington standards.  As Alexander Stephan might 
amazedly suggest, taxpayers really ought to take note.34  
 Standard risk-analytic procedures can be applied to the increases in 
domestic homeland security expenditures that have taken place since 9/11.  If 
that is done, it would be found that, in order for them to be deemed cost-
effective, they would have had to deter, prevent, foil, or protect against 333 
otherwise successful car bomb attacks (ones likely quite a bit larger than the 
one attempted on Times Square in 2010) per year, or about one a day.  And it 
appears that the protection of a standard office-type building would be cost-
effective only if the likelihood of a sizable terrorist attack on the building is a 
thousand times greater than it is at present.  Something similar holds for the 
protection of bridges.  On the other hand, hardening cockpit doors on airliners !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 See generally id. (exploring the underwear bomber attempt and portraying a high level 
of threat). 
31 See Shane Harris & Stuart Taylor, Homeland Security Chief Looks Back, and Forward, 
GOV’T EXECUTIVE (Mar. 17, 2008), http://www.govexec.com/defense/2008/03/homeland-
security-chief-looks-back-and-forward/26507/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2012).  
32 See Richard A. Serrano, U.S. Faces Heightened Threat Level, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 10, 
2011).  For commentary, see Heather Mac Donald, The Ever-Renewing Terror Threat (Feb. 
13, 2011), available at secularright.org. 
33 See MUELLER & STEWART, supra note 22, at 1–3.  
34 See id. at 21. 
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may be cost-effective, though the provision for air marshals on the planes is 
decidedly not.35  
 As with the hunts for witches and Communists, the chief challenge to 
the domestic counterterrorism system has been at what Trevor-Roper calls the 
“periphery.”36  The point is not that there is nothing to find, but that civil 
liberties and cost excesses can only be reduced if the internalized hysteria 
about terrorism is substantially dampened.  If people have come to believe that 
the chance every year of being killed by a terrorist is dangerously high (rather 
than one in 3.5 million), they are unlikely to be moved by concerns about civil 
liberty infringements or about expenditures, no matter how excessive, that are 
supposedly designed “to keep us safe.” 
 To undo, or even modify, the security system that has burgeoned over 
the last ten years, one must attack not simply the costs and consequences of the 
system, but the underlying premise that furnishes its essential engine.  
 
 
 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 See id. 
36 See TREVOR-ROPER, supra note 1.  
